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Abstract: Although, review manipulation has shown to have a significant adverse impact on 
consumer welfare, there is yet little understanding of which economic incentives drive this 
behavior as most of the current research has focused on the characteristics that define a fake 
review. The present study investigates these incentives using the innovative approach of 
examining one-time contributor user reviews as an alternative measure of review manipulation. 
With a sample comprising 450 hotels, registered on TripAdvisor, from the cities of Amsterdam 
and Brussels two type of studies were developed encompassing both cross-sectional and panel 
data analyses. The empirical results obtained show that review manipulation is sufficiently 
economically important since agents with different economic incentives will indulge in review 
fraud in a dissimilar extent. These incentives were found to include: the type of organizational 
structure; the total number of reviews; and the attributed user bubble rating. 
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Online Consumer review websites such as TripAdvisor, Amazon and Yelp have become 
increasingly popular in the past few years. This growth can be largely attributed to the 
ability of these platforms to reduce uncertainty regarding unobservable characteristics of 
products, creating both consumer and producer surplus (Dellarocas, 2006; Chevalier and 
Mayzlin, 2006).  
Nevertheless, as the popularity of these platforms has increased, so have concerns that 
the credibility of its reviews may be undermined by agents with the intent of engaging in 
review fraud (also known as review manipulation or fake reviews), not only to benefit 
themselves but also to harm competitors. This behavior is mainly driven by the desire to 
increase sales performance as current literature provides strong evidence of the existence 
of a significant connection between online reviews and consumer purchase decisions 
(Luca, 2011; Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006). However, consumers may also be adversely 
affected by fake reviews since this cheating behavior leads them to take suboptimal 
decisions, regarding products or services, that can further develop into mistrust, 
concerning this communication channel in later purchases. (Dellarocas, 2006).  
Therefore, the current policy of most online review platforms is to create constraints and 
punish this type of cheating behavior. For example, Amazon imposed a five reviews per 
week limit in products not bought on its online store, in an effort to clamp down paid fake 
reviewers (Bishop, 2016). This ruling comes after a suppression on companies that 
encourage incentivized reviews, that is, those that provide a free product in exchange for 
a positive review (Perez, 2016). Another example is TripAdvisor that maintains a list of 
around 30 blacklisted hotels who were caught bribing customers for positive user reviews 
through discounts and cut-price meals (Mirror, 2012) 
Additionally, governments have been imposing stricter guidelines in order to curb review 
manipulation or attempts to mislead the consumer. For example, the Federal Trade 
Commission updated its guidelines to include online consumer reviews, hence, a user 
must acknowledge, if any, the connection between himself and the reviewed product or 
service (FTC, 2009). Relatedly, the Congress of the United States recently enacted the 
Consumer Review Freedom Act, which addressed the usage of reservation “gag clauses” 
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that prevented users from expressing their opinion and allowed businesses to sue those 
who left a negative review (Addady,2016).  
Although clearly a topic of great concern and importance, literature pertaining it has been 
severely undermined as most of the current research has focused on the diverse 
characteristics that differentiate fake reviews from the truthful ones (Mayzlin et al, 2014; 
Luca and Zervas, 2016). This is also the strategy pursued by many of the major online 
review platforms, that have developed complex built-in algorithms that aim to detect and 
eliminate review fraud (e.g. Yelp). Nevertheless, the task of identifying suspected fake 
reviews is extremely difficult, since they try to mimic the characteristics of truthful ones, 
therefore leaving the question whether this is the right path to address this problem.  
As a consequence, in this thesis, the exercise of detecting fake reviews is sidetracked in 
favor of an alternative and newer approach that consists in an empirical analysis regarding 
the many economic incentives that characterize review fraud (Mayzlin et al., 2014). 
Additionally, as the relationship between reviews and sales performance is higher on 
experimental products (Babić Rosario et al., 2016), it is more pertaining to research this 
topic in such scenario, as the incentives to engage in review manipulation are higher. 
Therefore, this study aims to reply to the following problem statement: 
What are the economic incentives that encourage review manipulation in the hotel 
industry? 
Furthermore, this problem statement has been divided into four sub-questions: 1. How 
does the ownership structure of hotels incentivize manipulative behaviors?  2. How does 
competition encourage review fraud in the hotel industry? 3. Does the number of reviews 
alter the review manipulation equilibrium of hotels? 4. Can a change on the review rating 
reflect a change in incentives to engage in review manipulation? 
The present study contributes to the field of research by providing further insights 
regarding the incentives behind review manipulation and perhaps validates an alternative 
path to investigate this phenomenon. It also offers an empirically tested analysis in a 
setting more beneficial to the producer that has not been sufficiently investigated in 
current literature (Mayzlin et al 2014). Moreover, unlike previous research, this thesis 
uses a panel data set, that enables the construction of models concerning the different 
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characteristics that may alter the incentives to engage in review manipulation through the 
spectrum of time.  
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: chapter two discusses the theoretical 
foundations underpinning the current research and present the hypothesis that will be 
tested in this study; chapter three describes the context and data sources; chapter four 
reveals the research findings per hypothesis, chapter five discusses the results and 
analyzes them based on the conjectured hypotheses; chapter six the theoretical and 
practical implications of the achieved conclusions and chapter seven discusses the 
limitations of the performed study and provides recommendation for future research.
1-Goods that exploit the human senses and are used for luxury purposes (e.g. perfumes). 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1. From WOM to EWOM 
The power of word-of-mouth (WOM, hereafter) has been widely documented in 
consumer literature (Herr et al., 1991; King and Summers, 1970). The importance of this 
C2C communication channel lies on its large influence on consumers, since it is perceived 
as more persuasive and trustworthy than marketer created sources of information (Bickart 
and Schindler, 2001). 
Normally, WOM was defined as an oral communication between acquaintances (Arndt, 
1967), however, the advent of the Internet and the development of Web 2.0 led to a 
paradigm shift that further extended WOM and created a new online communication 
channel, commonly designated electronic word-of-mouth (eWOM, hereafter). Hennig- 
Thurau et al (2004) defined eWOM as: “any positive or negative statement made by 
potential, actual or former customers about a product or company, which is made 
available to a multitude of people and institutions via the internet” (p.39).  
An important characteristic of eWOM is the ability to make online recommendations 
under the guise of anonymity, allowing consumers to share feedback in a more 
comfortable way without geographical constraints (Goldsmith and Horowitz, 2006). This 
makes eWOM both more abundant and voluminous than tradition WOM which requires 
close ties between the consumers exchanging information and physical proximity in order 
to concretize the communication channel (Litvin et al., 2008).  
As a consequence, of these characteristics eWOM finds itself as having two major 
advantages over traditional WOM, both in terms of speed and reachability. This is 
important since this communicational channel has been found to be a good predictor of 
sales performance (Chen, Wang, and Xie 2011; Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006; Moe and 
Trusov 2011) and, therefore, an indispensable tool for marketers. This connection is 
amplified based on the degree of uncertainty of the product, meaning that eWOM has a 
stronger impact on experimental (e.g. hotels, restaurants), hedonistic1 and new goods 
(Dhar and Wertenbroch, 2000; Babić Rosario et al., 2016), since in these cases the 
assessment of the product qualities is more difficult prior to its use.
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2.2. Online Consumer Reviews  
Although eWOM communication has the ability to connect users through multiple 
channels (e.g .discussion forums, weblogs and news groups) (Hennig-Thurau et al., 
2004), one of the most prevalent and accessible forms of communication comes from 
online consumer reviews (Schindler & Bickart, 2005).  Unlike sellers who offer product-
oriented information, such as product attributes and technical specifications, online 
reviews deliver consumer-oriented information that describe products in terms of usage 
situations and measures its performance from a user’s perspective (Bickar & Schindler, 
2001). As in the case of eWOM, online consumer reviews have a substantial influence on 
the purchase decision-making process, and therefore sales performance, as it provides 
information through the lenses of a consumer (Zhu and Zhang, 2010; Babić Rosario et 
al., 2016).  
Literature pertaining this topic has been extensively covered in the past few years, 
however, possibly due to the sheer amount of research relating to it, certain subjects lack 
an overreaching consensus. One of such cases concerns the effects of review valence on 
sales performance. Although it seems straightforward that review valence has a positive 
or negative impact on sales performance, the relationship seems conflicting as this field 
of research is factionalized between those who argue that review valence is a good 
predictor of sales performance (e.g. Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006, Dellorocas et al., 2007, 
Chintagunta et al., 2010) and others who contend that review volume is a more reliant 
predictor (Gu et al., 2012; Ho-Dac et al., 2014; Liu 2006; Xiong and Bharadwaj, 2014). 
2.2.1. Review Helpfulness 
As a result of these inconsistences researchers started to look less at the connection 
between online consumer reviews and sales performance and started to dwell more upon 
the concept of “helpfulness”. This notion is evaluated through a peer-evaluation feature, 
that many major online review platforms incorporate into their website, that helps users 
find superior reviews. For example, TripAdvisor encourages users to provide a “Thanks” 
upvote if they find a particular review helpful. Hence, based on this feature, a new field 
of research was developed that permitted further assessment of the qualitative 
characteristics of reviews that ease consumer’s purchase decision making process. 
Overall review “helpfulness” can vary across three dimensions: reviewer reputation, 
review rating and review depth (Chua and Banerjee, 2015). 
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Reviewer reputation refers to the profile description of users who have submitted a review 
and that many online review platforms openly display for public scrutiny. For example, 
TripAdvisor gives the number of previous contributions and helpful votes of each specific 
user registered on its website.  Prior research has shown that user’s response to a given 
review is partly influenced by the contributor’s reputation (Pavlou and Dimoka, 2006). 
Others even contend that reviewers’ reputation plays an important role on predicting sales 
performance (Forman et al., 2008). This characteristic is also an important source of 
credibility for consumers, as even the more sceptic ones can venture to read past 
submitted reviews and appraise the reviewer based on its ability to write a helpful review 
(Ghose and Ipeirotis, 2011).  
Another helpful qualitative characteristic is the rating assessment. In most online review 
platforms users have to provide a rating appraisal of their experience, of the product or 
service, in order for the platform to conduct a single aggregated overall valence (Wu et 
al., 2011). These ratings usually comprise a five-point scale and tends to summarize, 
numerically, the entire content of the textual review (Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006). Prior 
research has shown that extreme ratings are more helpful, as they provide a clear 
argument in favor or against the usage of a certain product or service (Forman et al., 
2008). Alternatively, other schools of thought have reasoned that moderate rating are 
more helpful than extreme ones, as they present both the advantages and disadvantages 
of the products or services (Mudambi and Schuff, 2011). 
The last dimension is review depth, which is defined as a measure of the amount of textual 
content that reviewers provide to justify a given rating (Mudambi and Schuff, 2010) This 
characteristic is deemed helpful as it demonstrates the reviewer’s involvement and 
enthusiasm about the product, which plays an important role on the perceived quality of 
the review (Pan and Zhang, 2011). Reviews with substantial depth also provide a sense 
of adequacy and competence (Metzger, 2007; Wang, 2010). However, there is an optimal 
level of review depth as an overly detailed review may lead to reluctance from consumers 
(Otterbacher, 2009). 
These dimensions, within the concept of review “helpfulness”, additionally provide a 
glimpse of how consumers discern information, regarding the characteristics of the user 
and the review, in order to distinguish fake reviews from truthful ones. However, this 
argument is severely undermined, as the accuracy of human deception detection is low 
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due to people’s truth bias2, lack of physical deception cues from online consumer reviews 
(e.g. facial expression, body gesture and tone of voice) (Lim et al., 2010; Zhou and Zhang, 
2008; Wu et al., 2010) and the fact that many fake reviews are crafted in order to mimic 
the characteristics of unbiased ones (Lappas, 2012). 
2.3. Review Manipulation 
Frequently, fake reviews are published by agents with the intent of benefiting their own 
business or of harming competition. However, this behavior also provides adverse 
consequences to the consumers. This is supported by Mayzlin (2006) which states that 
review fraud results in welfare loss since lower quality products have further incentives 
to expend more on fake reviews than higher quality products, which may cause the 
consumer to make suboptimal decisions. Similarly, Dellarocas (2006) argues that if the 
manipulation on online forums was not possible, society as a whole would be better off 
since agents would develop a non-biased perception of firms and always pursue the 
optimal choice. However, it is also possible to minimize the negative effects of review 
manipulation by inciting a wider participation of unbiased reviewers or by developing 
filtering mechanisms that detect and completely remove agents with the intent of 
manipulation from participating in this communication channel (Mayzlin 2006; 
Dellarocas, 2006).  
2.3.1. Machine Learning 
Currently, most of the research within this field of study has been focused on this last 
solution since machine learning has been shown to considerably surpass human’s 
deception detection ability (Fuller et al., 2011; Fuller et al., 2013). Normally, a set of 
input features are generally used in order to explain the process of review fraud detection. 
One of such is the review content input features, which are based on the textual content 
of an online review. Although authentic and manipulated reviews are not easily 
distinguishable from each other, there might be delicate linguistic indications that sets 
them apart (e.g. number of nouns, verbs, adjectives, typos) (Hu and Liu, 2004; Ott et al. 
2011).  Another feature concerns the consumers’ ratings of products or services and the 
patterns of these assessments. This consists of the usage of certain general rating deviation 
metrics (e.g. the difference between a reviewer’s rating and the average rating) and rating 
deviation scores (e.g. the variance of a reviewer’s rating across products) (Mukherjee et 
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2- The benefits are associated with the gains in sales and the costs with the possibility of getting caught. 
al 2013a; Xu et al 2013). The last input feature relates to reviewers’ characteristics which 
encompasses nonverbal attributes of the behavior of the reviewers. These include the 
average number of reviews submitted, review votes cast, ratio of first time product 
reviews compared with total number of reviews and the presence of an avatar picture 
(Mukherjee et al 2013a; Mukherjee et al 2013b).  
2.3.2. Linkage with Economic Incentives 
Although machine learning literature provides strong contributes to the process of 
identifying fake reviews, a more recent nonmachine learning approach has been getting 
some traction. In this new field research, the identification of manipulated reviews is 
sidetracked, with the focus being given to the economic incentives behind the increase of 
review manipulation activity. This connection was first hypothesized by Mayzlin et al. 
(2014) which performed a cross-platform analysis, between Expedia and TripAdvisor, to 
derive the economic incentives behind review manipulation. Unlike TripAdvisor which 
allows anyone with a registered account to submit a review, Expedia requires proof of 
reservation which makes it costlier to engage in a behavior with the intent of 
manipulation. Hence, by exploiting this key difference between platforms, it was possible 
to demonstrate which market and organization factors account for a potential increase in 
review manipulation activity. Similarly, Luca and Zervas (2016) pursued the same goal 
of underlining the economic incentives behind review manipulation, however based on 
the assumption that reviews filtered by Yelp’s built-in algorithm are considered fake 
reviews. This key difference permitted the construction of a panel dataset, which allowed 
the implementation of a variety of new analyses, including the growth of review fraud 
over time and the role of changes in reputation. 
2.4. Hypotheses and Concept Development 
This thesis follows closely the reputational incentives model of the previously mentioned 
literature on review fraud, such as, Mayzlin et al. (2014) and Luca and Zervas (2016). In 
this model, it is assumed that firms follow an optimal level of review manipulation, 
therefore, an increase in the costs or benefits2 of review manipulation decreases or 
increases, respectively, the amount of manipulation in equilibrium and vice versa. This 
equilibrium is an important concept as it dictates the intensity of review manipulation 
activity in each hotel.
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2.4.1. Organizational Structure 
In this regard, it is safe to assume that firms’ organizational structure will affect the 
manipulation equilibrium. This statement is supported by prior reputational literature, for 
example Jin and Leslie (2009) argue that chain restaurants have higher hygiene standards 
due to stronger reputational incentives. Pierce and Snyder (2008) found that larger 
mechanical shops are less likely to adopt a cheating behavior and more likely to pass a 
given vehicle compared with independent shops.  Similarly, the case manifested in this 
thesis, is between chain-affiliated and an independent organizational structures in the 
hotel industry. Therefore, as argued, chain affiliated hotels are less likely to engage in a 
cheating behavior as they face higher costs due to reputational constraints. This is due to 
the negative effect of getting caught that can possibly spillover across the entire brand. 
For example, after executives of a Lynch Hotel Group chain-affiliated hotel in Dublin 
were caught buying fake reviews, TripAdvisor decided to punish the entire chain through 
a consumer alert display in every hotel affiliated with this chain, warning users of their 
illicit practices (McDonagh, 2012). Moreover, chain-affiliated hotels have less positive 
incentives to publish fake reviews since it would only yield positive effects to one single 
hotel and not to the entire chain (Mayzlin et al, 2014). Therefore, the following is the first 
conjecture hypothesis of this thesis: 
H1a: Chain-hotels have less incentives to publish fake reviews than independent hotels. 
Consistent with the previous developed hypothesis it is also argued that independent 
hotels have less costs associated with the submission of self-inflicted positive fake 
reviews, in their TripAdvisor page, since there are no possible spillover effects, hence: 
H1b: Independent hotels have more positive fake reviews. 
2.4.2. Competition 
Another important incentive that may alter the equilibrium of review manipulation is 
spatial competition. As stated in Mayzlin et al. (2014), besides publishing positive fake 
reviews in order to garner a higher rating, it is also feasible to downwardly manipulate 
the rating from a competitor by way of publishing a negative review. This cheating 
behavior, however, will only yield beneficial results if the fake review is aimed at a nearby 
hotel since it will increase the attractiveness of the manipulating agent in detriment of the 
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competitor (Mayzlin et al, 2014). As previously stated, independent hotels have more 
incentives to engage in review fraud, due to lower costs, therefore it is hypothesized that 
they will be prolifically active in this type of cheating behavior, henceforth: 
H2a: Hotels near independent hotels will have more negative fake reviews. 
Based on the previous hypothesis, it is additionally argued that hotels with a nearby 
competitor will have a larger review manipulation activity. The reasoning behind this 
statement comes from Luca (2011) which stated that a decreasing rating decreases sales 
performance. This means that after receiving a large influx of negative reviews, from 
competitors, the average rating will fall, increasing the benefits to engage in self-inflicted 
positive review manipulation, in order to recoup the lost rating. This tit for tat conduct 
will increase the total amount of fake reviews, hence: 
H2b: A hotel with a nearby competitor will have more fake reviews. 
2.4.3. Number of Reviews 
An additional incentive to adopt a behavior with the intent of manipulation is the total 
amount of reviews a hotel has obtained. TripAdvisor aggregates the reviews based on an 
average user review rating. The usage of such measure greatly increases the benefits of 
publishing early on a fake review when the total amount of reviews is low as it will have 
a greater effect on the average rating. However, the impact of this effect diminishes as 
the number reviews increases, due to the essence of the employed measure to aggregate 
the overall rating. Therefore, the following hypothesis is constructed: 







2.4.4. Review rating 
As previously mentioned, the attributed review rating plays an important role in 
predicting sales performance (Luca, 2011). Gauging by this assumption, negative reviews 
provide incentives to engage in positive review fraud as by doing so they avert the 
possible negative consequences of a diminishing negative rating. On the other hand, 
positive reviews diminish these incentives as they will keep the average rating in a good 
standing. Therefore, the following hypothesis is conjectured: 
H4: A negative rating increases incentives for positive review fraud and a positive rating 
decreases them. 
 
Table 1: Hypotheses description 
Hypothesis Description 
H1a Chain-hotels have less incentives to publish fake reviews than independent hotels. 
H1b Independent hotels have more positive fake reviews. 
H2a Hotels near independent hotels will have more negative fake reviews. 
H2b A hotel with a nearby competitor will have more fake reviews. 
H3 As the amount of reviews increases the incentives to leave a fake review decreases. 
H4 















The following section elaborates the procedures employed to test the proposed 
hypotheses. Starting first with a description of the context of the problem statement and 
moving on to the measures and the constructed models used to achieve meaningful 
results. 
3.1. Context 
According to a survey conducted by TripAdvisor (2016a), 81% of the travelers regard 
user generated online reviews important and 49% would not book a hotel without reviews. 
This survey underlines the emphasis of online reviews as an important communication 
channel that creates value to the consumer by reducing uncertainty towards experimental 
products, such as hotels. However, the user-generated business model, of many large 
online consumer reviews platforms, seems to underscore the quality of these reviews and 
its potential for value creation. Even though it encourages users to share their opinions, it 
also incentivizes behaviors with the intent of manipulation since there are large potential 
benefits to gain with little to no costs. Therefore, for this thesis, the online review platform 
TripAdvisor is examined, since as one of the major review platforms, it also pursues user-
generated business model providing an interesting setting to investigate review fraud. 
Presently, TripAdvisor claims to be the largest travel website in the world as it holds more 
than 385 million reviews and 350 million average monthly unique visitors. It is also a 
dominant review website for the hospitality sector with more than 1 million registered 
businesses, mostly hotels (TripAdvisor, 2016b). Its growth in the last years has been 
exponential as visualized in the collected reviews from the sample of hotels (figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Number of reviews in the sample, per day (from Jan/2010 to Aug/2016) 
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In this online platform, besides writing a textual review, users have to provide a bubble 
rating assessment of the service (any natural number from 1 to 5), which will be used by 
TripAdvisor in order to perform an aggregated average bubble rating. Businesses with a 
higher average will be displayed preeminently on the front page, which grants them more 
visibility to potential customers and can earn them a Traveler’s Choice distinction. 
Although these benefits are offered by TripAdvisor as a feature of review “helpfulness”, 
since it eases customer’s decision making, it may also encourage review manipulation by 
hotels who wish to reap some of the advantages provided by the increase in visibility. 
3.2. Sample Extraction 
The raw sample data consists of a number of hotels from the cities of Brussels and 
Amsterdam registered in the online review platform TripAdvisor. These two cities were 
selected based on the different competition scenarios, with Brussels having a more 
dispersed and lower hotel density than the more touristic city of Amsterdam. 
As the goal of this thesis is to evaluate review manipulation, the tenuous job of obtaining 
the submitted user reviews from this sample of hotels was necessary. Therefore, a python 
based “scrapper” with beautifulsoup4 software package was developed which 
automatically collected certain aspects of the review, including: user attributed bubble 
rating, review date, textual review, previous user contributions, username, hotel name and 
hotel address. This programming tool, however, had some limitations: it could not extract 
more than 300 characters from textual reviews, it could only collect English reviews 
(TripAdvisor offers multiple language options) and faced some difficulties extracting 
reviews from certain hotels. Overall, the “scrapper” was able to extract 211.451 English 
reviews from 450 hotels, a full list of the extracted hotels is available at the appendix in 












For the purpose of assessing the proposed hypotheses, both cross-sectional and panel data 
models were developed, hence, this section will be segmented based on this constraint. 
Starting first with an in-depth explanation of the measures employed in the cross-sectional 
and panel study and finishing with a table that describes the interpretation to follow on 
each employed measure. 
3.3.1. Cross-Sectional Study 
Dependent Variables: 
One-time contributor user reviews: As fake reviews try to mimic unbiased ones, and 
hence are difficult to detect, it is hard to find a perfect measure for this unit of analysis. 
Auspiciously, for this thesis, this is not as an important criterion as the aim is to 
understand the different economic incentives that drive review manipulation. Thus, an 
alternative unit of analysis is established, which consists of reviews made by contributors 
with one review in their profile reviewing history (designated one-time contributors, 
hereafter). The reasoning for this harsh assumption has four underlining supporting 
arguments. First, the most cost efficient way to engage in review fraud is to create a fake 
account on TripAdvisor, which only requires an email address, and submit a fake review. 
Second, Luca and Zervas (2016) found that suspected fake reviews, filtered by Yelp’s 
built-in algorithm, are mostly associated with characteristics of a novelty accounts, such 
as, a lack of profile image, friends and contributions. Third, according to review 
“helpfulness” theory, reviewer reputation is an important source of credibility by 
consumers using this communication channel (Chua and Banerjee, 2015). Lastly, it is 
possible to infer from figures 2 and 3 that one-time contributor user reviews are 








Based on this alternative unit of analysis, three dependent variables were developed that 
aim to capture the different conditions under which review manipulation may be 
instigated. The first dependent variable relates with the volume of suspected fake reviews 






Additionally, two further dependent variables with the intent of measuring the incidence 
of a specific bubble rating assessment on one-time contributor user reviews were 
constructed. This was achieved by performing the difference between the share of a 
specific rating on one-time contributor user reviews and that of the sample. Hence, to 
study the incidence of 5 bubble rating reviews on one-time contributor user reviews, 
compared with that of the sample (known as the positive difference of shares, hereafter), 









Likewise, to assess the incidence of negative one-time contributor user reviews, a similar 
equation is constructed by elaborating the difference of shares of user reviews with 1 and 








These difference of shares, selected as dependent variables (equation 2 and 3), are based 
on the proposed hypotheses that seek to test an increase in negative and positive review 
manipulation activity, while the share of one-time contributor user reviews (equation 1) 
aims to evaluate overall review manipulation activity. It is important to highlight that 
equation 2 pursues the study of positive review manipulation activity. Although positive 
reviews encompass reviews with a 5 and 4 bubble rating assessment, figure 2 
Figure 3: Rating distribution of the sample 
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demonstrates that there is a particularly higher incidence of one-time contributor user 
reviews with a 5 bubble rating assessment, which might create more insightful patterns. 
Independent Variables: 
Chain-hotels dummy: A distinction is made whether the hotel is chain-affiliated or an 
independent hotel, since ownership structure provides different incentives to engage in 
review fraud (Mayzlin et al., 2014; Luca and Zervas, 2016). To be considered chain-
affiliated a hotel has to be part of a brand with two or more hotels. Through their name, 
some hotels provide this information upfront (e.g. Holiday Inn Express Amsterdam, part 
of the Holiday Inn Group), others are more discrete (e.g. Bank’s Hotel, part of the Carlton 
Group). In order to make this distinction, each hotel website was investigated since their 
chain-affiliation is acknowledged there. Unlike Mayzlin et al. (2014), in this thesis, 
franchised hotels are considered chain-affiliated hotels due to lack of data to make such 
segmentation. 
Neighbor dummy: Spatial competition increases the benefits from engaging in review 
fraud (Mayzlin et al., 2014). As in Mayzlin et al. (2014), the threshold of less than 0,5 km 
is used in order to determine if a hotel has a nearby competitor. To perform this distinction 
each hotel address, extracted from the “scrapper”, was converted into a geographical 
coordinate and introduced into Google Maps Distance Matrix API, which calculated the 
distance between the different coordinates. 
Chain-affiliated and Independent neighbor dummies: Similarly, like the previous 
dummy, the same method and threshold is used in order to determine whether a hotel has 
a chain-affiliated or an independent neighbor since different ownership structures offer 
different review manipulation equilibriums which may be interesting to study in a 
competitive scenario (Mayzlin et al 2014). 
Control Variables: 
City dummy: As previously mentioned, both the city of Amsterdam and Brussels display 
unique characteristics in terms of concentration and hotel density, providing the necessity 
of this dummy for the sake of capturing these differences.  
Share of short reviews: Since reviewers with the intent of manipulation are mostly 
concerned with the bubble rating assessment, they are likely to give little care to its textual 
component and provide few details about the quality of the product or service. Therefore, 
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3- Long reviews (>300 characters) are not fully displayed and the consumer must manually expand the review. 
it is assumed that the existence of short reviews goes hand in hand with review 
manipulation activity. For this thesis, reviews with less than 300 characters were 
considered short reviews, as this is the limit by which TripAdvisor displays the full 
review3. 
Average bubble rating: The average bubble rating is provided of a great predictive 
power in terms of sales performance (Luca, 2011). Henceforth, this variable is of great 
importance since it captures the impact that different review ratings may have over the 
benefits to engage in review manipulation. Unlike user attributed bubble ratings, a hotel 
average bubble rating can take middle values of any natural number between 1 and 5 (e.g. 
4.5). 
3.3.2. Panel Study 
Dependent Variables: 
One-time contributor user reviews: As previously mentioned one-time contributor user 
reviews is the employed unit analysis since it is hard to identify and gauge fake reviews. 
Based on this reasoning, two dependent variables are developed for the purpose of 
assessing the stated hypotheses, these are: the share of one-time contributor user reviews 
and the positive difference of shares. The underlining description and calculation of these 
variables is similar to the ones, with the same name, mentioned in the cross-sectional 
study, however, in this case, within a panel study setting. 
Independent Variables: 
Bubble rating lagged variables: In order to identify how the user rating of a submitted 
review alters the incentives to engage in review manipulation, all possible user attributed 
bubble ratings (5,4,3,2,1) are employed as independent variables. However, it is assumed 
that this effect will not be instant as the agents with the intent to engage in review fraud 
will not take an immediate response in order to decrease the possibilities of getting caught, 
hence the necessity of the lagged measures (𝑡 − 1). 
 
Logarithm of the total number of reviews: The purpose of this control variable is to 
capture the effects of the growth of the number of cumulative reviews and its potential 
impact over the benefits to gain from engaging in review manipulation. As hotels usually
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exhibit an exponential growth of reviews, through time, a logarithm transformation is 
used which converts this growth pattern into a linear one.  
3.3.3. Table of Measures 
 
Table 2: Measures description and code 





Share of the number of one-time contributor user 








Difference of shares of 5 bubble rating reviews between 
one-time contributors and the total sample, for each 
hotel in the sample. 







Difference of shares of 1 and 2 bubble rating reviews 
between one-time contributors and the total sample for 





Share of the number of one-time contributor user 








Difference of shares of 5 bubble rating reviews between 
one-time contributors and the total sample, per hotel in 
the sample and per month. 
Independent variable 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖 
Dummy variable: a binary value of 1 for chain-affiliated 
hotels and 0 for independent hotels, for each hotel in the 
sample. 
Independent variable 𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖 
Dummy variable: a binary value of 1 for the existence 
of nearby competitors and 0 for the lack of it, for each 
hotel in the sample. 
Independent variable 𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖  
Dummy variable: a binary value of 1 for the existence 
of nearby chain-affiliated competitors and 0 for the lack 
of it, for each hotel in the sample. 
Independent variable 𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖 
Dummy variable: a binary value of 1 for the existence 
of nearby independent competitors and 0 for the lack of 
it, for each hotel in the sample. 
Independent variable 
𝑓𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑓𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 
𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 
One month lagged variables of the amount of reviews 
with a specific attributed bubble rating (five, four, three, 
two and one bubbles) per hotel in the sample and per 
month. 
Independent variable Log⁡(𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡)𝑖𝑡 
The logarithm of the cumulative number of reviews, per 
hotel in the sample and per month. 
Control variable 𝐵𝑢𝑏𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 
Aggregated average bubble rating (any natural number 
from 1 to 5) for each hotel in the sample. 
Control variable 𝐵𝑟𝑠𝑙𝑠𝑖 
Dummy variable: a binary value of 1 for each hotel 
located in Brussels and 0 for each hotel located in 
Amsterdam. 
Control variable 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖 
The percentage of textual short reviews (reviews with 






The constructed models used to enable the development of the findings are described 
here, as well as the expected conclusions to achieve from the variables in order to support 
the stated hypotheses. Similarly, to the previous section, the models are segmented based 
on the type of study pursued. 
3.4.1. Cross-Sectional Study 
Cross-sectional studies rely on data, of a sample of observations, taken at a specific point 
in time. A stressing feature of this type of study, however, is that not all observations 
correspond precisely to the same time period. Hence, it differs from time series analysis 
where the natural temporal ordering of observations is an important component of the 
analysis (Wooldridge, 2000). For the purpose of assessing hypotheses H1a, H1b, H2a and 
H2b three cross-sectional models were constructed using a combination of the previously 
mentioned measures. Additionally, it is worthy of mentioning that the employed sample, 






= 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑢𝑏𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑟𝑠𝑙𝑠𝑖 +⁡𝛽5𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖 +







= 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖 + 








= 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖 +⁡𝛽3𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖 + 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝛽4𝐵𝑢𝑏𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐵𝑟𝑠𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑖 = 1, …𝑁 
 
With the exception of model 1, each regression model is associated with a different 
hypothesis, therefore, allowing for a clearer distinction of its purpose. First, model 1 
identifies the impact of organizational structure on the share of one-time contributor user 
reviews with the purpose of assessing hypothesis H1a. Therefore, it is expected that the 
coefficient of the variable 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖, will result in a negative value as chain-affiliated hotels 
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are predicted to have a smaller share of one-time contributor user reviews due to a lower 
review manipulation activity. Concerning the independent variable ⁡𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖, it is 
noteworthy to mention that it is not segmented based on ownership structure, as in the 
other models, so as to appraise hypothesis H2b. Since competition is expected to increase 
review manipulation activity, the coefficient of this variable is predicted to have a positive 
effect over the share of one-time contributor user reviews. 
On the other hand, model 2 and 3 apply the positive and negative difference of shares, in 
order to evaluate hypothesis H1b and H2a, respectively. First, from model 2, the 
coefficient of the variable 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖 is expected to be negative, as chain-affiliated hotels are 
predicted to have a smaller share of positive one-time contributor reviews than the share 
of the sample, due to lower incentives to engage in self-inflicted positive review 
manipulation. Moreover, in model 3, the independent variable 𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖 is foreseen to 
be positive. Since independent competitors are stated to have more incentives to engage 
in review fraud they are more likely to downwardly manipulate the average bubble rating 
of nearby hotels, in order to increase their own attractiveness, boosting the share of 
negative one-time contributor user reviews of these competitors in the process. 
3.4.2. Panel Study 
Lastly two additional models were employed in order to reproduce the proposed panel 
study. A panel study relies on panel data which basically consists of a time series for each 
cross-sectional observation in the data set. The major advantage of this study, over the 
cross-sectional one, is the ability to track the behavior of an observation through time 
(Wooldridge, 2000). Henceforth, for the purpose of testing the proposed hypotheses, a 
panel dataset was constructed which consists of 450 panels (representing every hotel in 
the sample) and each measure organized on a monthly basis (t = 1 month) within the 
timeframe of Jan/2010 to Aug/2016 (Dec/2009 to July/2016 for the lagged measures), 
consisting of 158.062 submitted reviews overall. Since most of the hotels were not 
registered on TripAdvisor, throughout this timeframe, the resulting panel data set is 
unbalanced, giving a total number of observations of N = 24544. The following are the 




= 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑓𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑓𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑖𝑡−1 +⁡𝛽5𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 +










= 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑓𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑓𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝛽4𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑖𝑡−1 +⁡𝛽5𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽6Log⁡(𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡)𝑖𝑡 +⁡𝜀𝑖𝑡 ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑡 = 1,2, …𝑁⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑖 = 1,2, . . 𝑁 
 
Alike the cross-sectional models, each panel study model corresponds to a unique 
underlining hypothesis with model 4 and 5 associated with hypothesis H3 and H4, 
respectively. First, in model 4 it is expected that the variable Log⁡(𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡), will have a 
negative coefficient on the monthly share of one-time contributor user reviews since an 
increase in the number of reviews is foreseen to decrease the incentives to engage in 
review manipulation, due to the diminishing impact it has over the average bubble rating 
of a hotel. Second, model 5 investigates the effects of the lagged variables of user 
attributed bubble ratings on the positive difference of shares, on a monthly basis. In this 
model it is expected that the positive user attributed ratings (𝑓𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 and 𝑓𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡−1) will 
have a negative coefficient and the negative user attributed ratings (𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑖𝑡−1 and 𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑡−1) 
will have a positive coefficient. The reasoning behind these projected results comes from 
the understanding that a positive rating provides no benefits to engage in positive review 
manipulation, as the average bubble rating will not be adversely impacted. However, if 
the user attributed rating is negative, these benefits increase as agents with the intent of 
manipulation will be incentivized to submit a fake review in order to prevent the possible 











In the following section the applied estimation techniques and its underlining assumptions 
are elaborated. Furthermore, the interpretation of descriptive statistics as well as the 
results obtained from the regression models, in order to test the proposed hypotheses, are 
scrutinized and detailed. 
4.1. Statistical Assumptions 
4.1.1. Cross-Sectional Study 
For the models used in the cross-sectional study, the estimation technique ordinary least 
squares (OLS) is employed. This estimation method is applied since it determines the 
unknown parameters in a linear regression model with the intent of minimizing the sum 
of the squares residuals. Moreover, the OLS estimators are one of the few estimators 
which, under certain conditions, can be deemed BLUE (Best Linear Unbiased Estimator) 
(Wooldridge, 2000).  
Some underlining assumptions, however, have to be respected in order to conduct 
inference of the estimators and to consider the results from the OLS the best linear 
unbiased estimators (Wooldridge, 2000). These assumptions include: normality; no 
multicollinearity; and homoscedasticity of the error terms. All of these assumptions were 
tested using the econometric tools available on Stata. 
Firstly, the normality assumption needs to be assessed. Although normality plays no 
significant role in demonstrating that the OLS estimator is the best linear unbiased 
estimator, it is necessary to conduct exact statistical inference. Hence, for each model, a 
histogram (figure 9,10 and 11 at the appendix) is constructed, in order to visualize the 
distribution of residuals and the existence of skewness and kurtosis. Furthermore, the 
Shapiro-Wilk test is conducted (figure 4), to address the null hypothesis of existence of 
normality. The results from the histograms are inconclusive, however the Shapiro-Wilk 
test clearly rejects (p<0.05) the hypothesis of existence of normality of the residuals in 













Since, for this thesis, the goal is to use parametric tests (since they possess more statistical 
power), it is assumed that the central limit theorem applies. This theorem states that non-
normal data has an approximate normal distribution, no matter what the distribution of 
the original data looks like, as long as the sample size is large enough. Therefore, as the 
sample size in this study is somehow large (N = 450), asymptotic normality is accepted, 
although the power of the model is greatly diminished (Wooldridge, 2000). 
An additional important assumption of the OLS estimators is that the independent 
variables do not display multicollinearity. Violation of this assumption can lead to bias 
of the coefficients of the independent variables meaning that the OLS estimators are no 
longer BLUE. In order to test this assumption, the variance inflation factor (VIF) as well 
as a correlation matrix are developed. Table 3 demonstrates the inexistence of any 
substantial correlation between variables from the same model, a conclusion further 
supported by the VIF, where all measures were found below the threshold of 10. 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 VIF  
1) onecontrib 1                   - 
2) PositiveDiff -0.178 1                 - 
3) NegativeDiff -0.2451 -0.3568 1               - 
4) Chain -0.2793 0.0574 0.0432 1             1.14 (1.18)  
5) Neigh 0.1096 -0.0656 -0.0721 -0.1716 1           1.13     
6) NeighInd 0.0883 -0.0414 -0.0371 -0.2346 0.6497 1         1.11     
7) NeighChain 0.0620 -0.0946 -0.0263 -0.1509 0.5526 0.2746 1       1.11     
8) Bubble -0.4752 0.2156 -0.1870 0.3059 -0.0712 -0.0701 -0.0754 1     1.03     
9) Brsls -0.3514 0.0901 0.1799 0.0314 -0.0258 -0.0168 -0.1111 0.0194 1   1.00 (1.01)  
10) Shareshort 0.4768 -0.1147 -0.1702 0.0598 0.0467 0.0189 -0.0382 -0.0723 0.0333 1 1.02    
Table 3: Correlation Matrix and VIF results (cross-sectional) 
Note: onecontrib: Share of one-time contributor user reviews; PositiveDiff: Positive difference of shares; 
NegativeDiff: Negative difference of shares. Number in brackets represents VIF for models 2 and 3, all 
other VIF values are equal in all models. 
Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data 
         Ho: Normal distribution of the residuals 
          
Model 1: 
          Prob > z  =   0.0009 
 
Model 2: 
        Prob > z  =   0.0000 
 
Model 3: 
         Prob > z  =   0.0000 
Figure 4: Shapiro-Wilk test for normal data 
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Lastly, a Breusch-Pagan test is employed in order to assess the existence of 
homoscedasticity in the proposed OLS regression models. This assumption states that the 
variance of the unobservable residuals conditional on the independent variables, is 
constant. From figure 5, it is possible to infer that all models reject the null hypothesis of 
existence of homoscedasticity in favor of the alternative hypothesis of existence of 
heteroscedasticity. Since heteroscedasticity causes the standard errors to be biased and 
the OLS estimators no longer BLUE, heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are used 
as they relax the assumption that error terms are independent and identically distributed, 
and provide a reliable t statistic if the sample size is significantly large (Wooldridge 
2000). 
4.1.2. Panel Study 
Given the panel study nature of the last two regression models, estimating regression 
analyses in panel data structures requires special econometric modelling. This thesis 
estimated the empirical model employing the panel estimation procedures in Stata, which 
offers a broad range of tools for the analysis of panel data. (Stata Manual, 2005) 
There are several possible estimation techniques to select from when adopting a panel 
data approach. In order to do so, one has to consider certain problems in panel data 
structures, that might affect the efficiency and explanatory power of the coefficients and 
standard errors, such as, serial correlation, heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity. 
Initially a Hausman test is performed (figure 6) to find whether the random-effects model 
or the fixed-effects model is the most appropriate method to conduct the panel regression 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance  
Model 1: 
          chi2(1)      =    39.53 
          Prob > chi2  =   0.0000 
 
Model 2: 
chi2(1)      =    38.80 
        Prob > chi2  =   0.0000 
 
Model 3: 
chi2(1)      =    36.54 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0000 
Figure 5: Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity 
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analysis. As it is possible to visualize in figure 6, the null hypothesis of random effects 







Furthermore, as in the cross-sectional study, the assumption of existence of 
homoscedasticity was evaluated. In order to perform this assessment, a modified Wald 
test was employed which tested the null hypothesis of existence of homoscedasticity. As 
it is possible to infer below (figure 7), the null hypothesis is rejected (p<0.05) in favor of 






A further problem that often occurs when carrying out panel regressions is the presence 
of serial correlation (also known as autocorrelation). Serial correlation in linear panel data 
models causes the estimates of the regression coefficients to be consistent but less 
efficient, and may create an underestimation of the standard errors rendering hypothesis 
testing no longer valid. (Wooldridge, 2000). Hence, the Wooldridge test for 
autocorrelation in panel data was implemented in order to detect the presence of this 
phenomenon. As it is possible to conclude from figure 8, the null hypothesis (p<0.05) of 
no serial correlation is rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis of its existence
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroscedasticity: 
Model 4: 
chi2 (450)  =   6.5e+05 
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
 
Model 5: 
chi2 (450)  =   1.5e+08 
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
 
Hausman Test: 
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
Model 4: 
chi2(6) =       19.67 
Prob>chi2 =      0.0032 
 
Model 5: 
chi2(6)      =    167.50 
Prob > chi2  =   0.0000 
 
 Figure 6: Hausman test 
Figure 7: Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroscedasticity 
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4- Autoregressive model of first order: current value is based on an immediate preceding value. 






Faced with the presence of both serial correlation and heteroscedasticity a fixed-effects 
model is no longer statistically reliable and a Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) 
model will be pursued in this thesis. The downside of the FGLS estimator is that it may 
not be consistent in small or medium samples. Nevertheless, it is asymptotically more 
efficient than the OLS estimator when the AR(1)4 model of serial correlation holds and 
the sample is large. Additionally, the FGLS disregards the necessity of homoscedasticity 
in the model (Wooldridge 2000). 
Lastly, table 4 demonstrates the correlation matrix of the variables used in the panel study. 
Although there is some significant correlation between the measures five and four lagged 
bubble ratings, the VIF column discards the existence of any possible multicollinearity 
since the achieved results are below the threshold of 10. 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 VIF 
1) onecontrib 1               - 
2) PositiveDiff -0.6160 1             - 
3) five lagged -0.0622   -0.0772    1           2.22 
4) four lagged -0.0683   -0.0475    0.6558    1         3.34 
5) three lagged -0.0582    0.0009    0.3235    0.5384    1       1.11 
6) two lagged -0.0307    0.0123    0.1499    0.2780    0.3461    1     1.11 
7) one lagged -0.0023    0.0266    0.0732    0.1493    0.2314    0.2102    1   1.03 
8) Log(count) -0.5583    0.2968    0.4213    0.4590    0.3416    0.2035    0.1260    1 1.02 
Table 4: Correlation Matrix and VIF results (panel study) 
Note: onecontrib: Share of one-time contributor user reviews; PositiveDiff: Positive difference of shares. 
 
 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first-order autocorrelation 
Model 4: 
Prob>F =      0.0000 
 
Model 5: 




4.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the cross-sectional models are reported in Table 5 and include 
average, standard deviation and value ranges from a sample of 450 hotels. From this table 
it is possible to infer that, on average, 14.29% of the reviews from each hotel are from 
users with a single contribution in their profile history. The value ranges are, however, 
large (58.25% maximum and 0.84% minimum).  
Regarding the positive and negative difference of shares, it is concluded that there is a 
very high standard deviation, in the sample, concerning both dependent variables (10.95% 
and 10.77% respectively), compared with the average (7.54% and 8.1% respectively). 
This is also reflected on the wide discrepancy demonstrated on the maximum and 
minimum value ranges. 
From the variable that measure competition (Neigh), it is deduced that most hotels in the 
sample have a nearby competitor (92.44%). If we dwell into the organizational structure 
of these competitors (NeighInd and NeighChain), it is reported that, on average, there is 
a higher presence of nearby independent competitors (83.78%) when compared with 
chain-affiliated competitors (78.89%). This might be a consequence of the smaller share 
of chain-affiliated hotels in the sample (38.44%, as displayed by Chain) as opposed to 







Note: onecontrib: Share of one-time contributor user reviews; PositiveDiff: Positive difference of shares; 
NegativeDiff: Negative difference of shares. 
Table 6 displays the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the panel study and, 
similarly to the previous table, it includes average, standard deviation and value ranges 
from 24.544 observations within the timeframe mentioned in the previous section. 
Concerning the submitted reviews per month, it is noteworthy to mention that reviewers, 




onecontrib 450 0.1429 0.0942 0.5825 0.0084 
PositiveDiff 450 0.0754 0.1095 0.5854 -0.5336 
NegativeDiff 450 0.0810 0.1077 0.5867 -0.1690 
Chain 450 0.3844 0.4870 1 0 
Neigh 450 0.9244 0.2646 1 0 
NeighInd 450 0.8378 0.3691 1 0 
NeighChain 450 0.7889 0.4086 1 0 
Brsls 450 0.3111 0.4635 1 0 
Bubble 450 3.7267 0.6837 5 1.5 
Shareshort 450 0.2031 0.0634 0.5208 0.06 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics for the cross-sectional study 
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on average and within the determined timeframe, tend to submit more positive reviews 
(2.4789 and 2.2539, 4 and 5 bubbles rating reviews, respectively) than negative reviews 
(0.2802 and 0.1983, 2 and 1 bubbles rating reviews, respectively). This is also highlighted 
in table 5, where the average bubble rating assessment of the sample was 3.7267, meaning 
that most of the user assessments are concentrated within 5 and 4 bubbles (also similar to 
the results obtained in figure 3).  
Moreover, both dependent variables, share of one-time contributor user reviews and the 
positive difference of shares, exhibit a wide incongruity in the descriptive results with a 
high standard deviation (170,25% and 574,46%, respectively) compared with their 
average values (74.64% and -101.2%). It is also important to mention that the value of 
the positive difference of shares is negative on the descriptive results, meaning that the 
share of 5 bubble rating user reviews made by one-time contributors is, on a monthly 
average, smaller than the total share of 5 bubble rating user reviews, for each hotel in the 
sample. 
Lastly, the variable of the logarithm of the number of cumulative reviews has an average 
of 1.6503 and a small standard deviation (0.7736) compared with the average. 
Nevertheless, the value ranges present a large discrepancy, with a maximum of 3.5615 
and a minimum of 0. 
 
 









onecontrib  24544 0.7464 1.7025 3.40 0.005 
PositiveDiff 24544 -1.0120 5.7446 6.60 -2.49 
five lagged 24544 2.4789 5.1356 68 0 
four lagged 24544 2.2539 3.3850 43 0 
three lagged 24544 0.8943 1.4093 14 0 
two lagged 24544 0.2802 0.6384 8 0 
one lagged 24544 0.1983 0.5242 6 0 
Log(count) 24544 1.6503 0.7736 3.5615 0 
Table 6: Descriptive statistics for the panel study 
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4.3. Regression Results 
4.3.1. Cross-Sectional Study 
Table 7 shows the results of the OLS regressions of the performed cross-sectional study 
by displaying the effects of the chosen independent and control variables on the dependent 
variables. As previously mentioned, the following dependent variables are used: share of 
one-time contributor user reviews; positive difference of shares; and negative difference 
of shares on models 1,2 and 3, respectively. Additionally, these models aim to test 
hypothesis H1a, H1b, H2a and H2b. 
Table 7: Results of the cross-sectional regression models 
Model 1 demonstrates a significant and negative impact (𝛽 = -0.0343, p<0.01) of the 
share of one-time contributor user reviews on the variable 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖, at a 99% significance 
level. This lends support for hypothesis H1a which predicted a negative effect between a 
chain-affiliated organizational structure and the incentives to engage in review fraud. As 









    
        
 
 
 -0.0343***  -0.0039  0.0266** 
   (0.0060)  (0.0110)  (0.0089) 
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   (0.0051)  (0.0064)  (0.0071) 
 
 
      
  -0.0722***  0.0189  0.0437*** 
   (0.0061)  (0.0121)  (0.0123) 
        
 
 
0.6998***  -0.1764**  -0.3419*** 
(0.0633)  (0.0696)  (0.7359) 
        
        
Observations  450  450  450 
R-squared  0.58  0.07  0.12 
        
Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 










affiliated have, on average, a smaller share of one-time contributor user reviews compared 
with independent hotels. Nevertheless, the same model rejects hypothesis H2b, which 
predicted a positive effect between the presence of a nearby competitor and the incentives 
to submit fake reviews. Although the coefficient of 𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖 is positive (𝛽 = 0.0080), 
which suggests that hotels with a nearby competitor have, on average, a higher share of 
one contributor reviews, it is not statistically significant (p>0.10). 
In model 2 it is inferred that the independent variable 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖 has a negative effect (𝛽 = 
 -0.0039) on the positive difference of shares. This goes hand in hand with the conjectured 
hypothesis H2b, where it was argued that independent hotels have a stronger positive 
review manipulation activity than chain-affiliated hotels. However, these results are not 
statistically significant (p>0.10), hence hypothesis H2b is not supported. 
Moreover, model 3 assesses hypothesis H2a, which stated that hotels with a nearby 
independent neighbor have a larger influx of negative fake reviews. Henceforth, it was 
predicted that the independent variable 𝑁𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖   had a negative effect on the negative 
difference of shares. However, this is not the case as the coefficient is neither positive (β =  
-0.0046) nor statistically significant (p>0.10), therefore, hypothesis H2a is not supported. 
Interestingly, although not within the scope of this study, the independent variable 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖 
was found to have a negative and significant effect on the negative difference of shares 
(𝛽 = 0.0266, p<0.05). This indicates that chain-affiliated hotels have, on average, a 
disproportionally large share of negative one-time contributor user reviews. 
Lastly, it is also important to highlight the small value of the R-squared of model 2 and 
3. The R-squared is a goodness of fit estimator that can be interpreted as the fraction of 
the dependent variable that is explained by the independent and control variables 
(Wooldridge, 2000). As it is possible to conclude, model 2 and 3 have a R-squared of 
only 7% and 12%. This value is not unfamiliar since Mayzlin et al. (2014) achieved 
similar results in their research. Therefore, it seems that the complex nature of the 
dependent variables, as it represents a difference of shares, largely explains the low values 




4.3.2. Panel Study 
Concerning the panel study, table 8 displays the results of these two analyzes. As 
previously mentioned, the following dependent variables are used: share of one-time 
contributor user reviews and the positive difference of shares in models 4 and 5, 
respectively, in a monthly basis. Additionally, these models aim to test hypothesis H3 and 














Table 8: Results of the panel study regression models 
The results of model 4 show a negative and significant impact of the independent 
variable, Log⁡(𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡)𝑖𝑡 ⁡, on the share of one-time contributor user reviews (𝛽 = -1.5366, 
p<0.01). This lends support for hypothesis H3 which stated that review manipulation 
activity decreases as the cumulative number of reviews increases, since it progressively 
makes it harder for fake reviews to have a significant impact on the average bubble rating 
of a hotel. Furthermore, from this model, it is possible to infer that the bubble rating 
assessment of the previous month has a significant and positive impact on the share of 








    
       
 
 
 0.0407***  -0.1944***  
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   (0.0129)  (0.0507)  
       
       
Observations  24544  24544  
Type of Model  FGLS  FGLS  
      
Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 










a negative bubble rating assessment of one and two (𝛽 = 0.0830 and 𝛽 = 0.1267, for two 
and one bubble rating assessments, respectively). 
Model 5 evaluates hypothesis H4, which predicted an increase of positive review 
manipulation activity after a submitted user review with a negative rating in the previous 
month. This hypothesis is partially supported as the results show that a submitted review 
with a bubble rating of one, has on average, a positive and significant impact on the 
positive difference of shares (𝛽 = 0.1156, p<0.10), in the next month. However, the 
independent lagged variable that measures the impact of a 2 bubbles rating user review 
over the positive difference of shares, lacks supporting evidence for the stated hypothesis 
as its coefficient is neither positive nor significant (𝛽 = -0.0927, p<0.10). 
Additionally, the developed model demonstrates that positive user submitted reviews 
have a negative and statistically significant (p<0.01) effect on the positive difference of 
shares (𝛽 = -0.1944 and 𝛽 = -0.1980, for five and four bubble rating respectively). This 
relationship shows that positive user reviews disincentivizes positive review 




Result Significance Supported 
H1a - - Y Yes 
H1b - - N No 
H2a + + N No 
H2b + - N No 
H3 - - Y Yes 
H4 +/+/-/- +/+/+/- Y/Y/N/Y Partially 





In the subsequent section, the implications of the empirical findings are discussed. 
Henceforth each factor that was conjectured has having a contributing effect on review 
manipulation activity is segmented and further analyzed based on the developed 
hypothesis and the conclusions of the results section. 
5.1. Organizational Structure 
The findings regarding organizational structure are partially in accordance with previous 
literature on the subject (Mayzlin et al., 2014). First, the results achieved, in model 1, 
demonstrate that the costs to engage in review manipulation is higher for chain-affiliated 
hotels since they face possible spillover effects over the entire brand if caught. Moreover, 
it provides supporting evidence that chain-affiliated hotels yield less benefits from 
engaging in review fraud as it would only subsidize one hotel in the entire chain. 
Nevertheless, the results from model 2, seem to display a lack of prolific five bubble 
rating review manipulation abuse by independent hotels, since the estimate coefficient of 
the variable 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖 lacks statistical significance, removing some credibility to the 
underlining argument. 
However, looking into table 10 at the appendix, it is evident that if the dependent variable 
is altered to the difference of shares of 4 bubble rating reviews, the independent variable 
of interest (𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖) is both negative and statistically significant (𝛽 = -0.0215, p<0.05). 
The manifested finding demonstrates that positive review manipulation activity, of 
independent hotels, is mainly concentrated within self-inflicted 4 bubble rating 
assessments. The reasoning for the deployment of such behavior might be the need of 
agents with the intent of manipulation to remain undetected since extreme positive 
reviews may look more suspicious than the more moderate 4 bubble rating assessments.   
5.2. Competition 
As it is possible to infer from the constructed cross-sectional models, there is no statistical 
significance in all of the variables used to analyze the effects of spatial competition on 
review manipulation activity. A possible explanation for the lack of suitable findings is 
the different methodology used to analyze the inherent competition factors that may 
incentivize review manipulation. Mayzlin et al. (2014), neglected cities with a large hotel 
density as to avoid difficulties in interpreting spatial competition patterns. Nevertheless, 
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in this thesis this criterion was not employed, and two cities, with a somehow large 
number of hotels, are studied which may have created difficulties in finding support for 
the proposed hypotheses. 
However, there is some supportive evidence of the existence of an ampler concept of 
competition not captured by the proposed measures. As seen in model 3, the variable 
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖 is both positive and statistically significant. This finding demonstrates that chain-
affiliated hotels are disproportionally more frequently targeted by negative fake reviews. 
Since they have, on average, a larger average bubble rating assessment (3.9913 for chain-
affiliated hotels and 3.5614 for independent hotels) it seems straightforward that this type 
of organizational structure offers a good target for competitors who wish to increase their 
own attractiveness. Hence, although not within the measures used to analyze competition, 
it might provide a reliant alternative for the existence of competition effects on a wider 
scale that were not captured by the proposed measures as these were meant to obtain 
spatial competition effects. 
5.3. Number of Reviews  
Model 4 demonstrates that, on average, as the number of reviews grows the share of one-
time contributor user reviews decreases as shown by the negative and statistically 
significant coefficient of the variable Log⁡(𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡)𝑖𝑡. This supports previous literature 
(Luca and Zervas, 2016), since it establishes that reviewers with the intent to engage in 
review manipulation will find less incentives when there is a larger number of reviews, 
because the effectiveness of review fraud in such scenario will yield minimal change to 
the average bubble rating of a hotel. However, if the hotel has yet a small number of 
reviews, the impact of a potential fake review bubble rating assessment will be more 
severe on the average bubble rating and therefore providing more benefits to engage in 
review manipulation.   
Additionally, in the same model, it is possible to conclude that as the lagged bubble rating 
increases, the coefficient of the lagged variables on the share of one-time contributor user 
reviews generally decreases. This is a largely expected result as a negative review 
incentivizes further review manipulation in order to keep the average bubble rating 
constant or towards an increasing trend. On the other hand, positive reviews decrease 
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these incentives as there is a lack of economic factors that justify the need to alter the 
average. The following sub-section looks into this phenomenon into more detail. 
5.4. Review Rating  
Model 5 shows a positive and statistically significant effect of reviews with a bubble 
rating of one on the positive difference of shares. This reveals that submitting a negative 
review with a bubble rating assessment of one encourages five bubble rating review 
manipulation, in the next month, as agents with the intent of fraud will attempt to 
counterbalance the potential adverse consequences that this rating may impose. However, 
this is not verified on all negative bubble rating assessments since the effects of the lagged 
variable of submitting a review with a bubble rating of two is neither positive nor 
statistically significant on the positive difference of shares. A conceivable explanation for 
this phenomenon is present at model 4 where the coefficient of the lagged variable of 
reviews with a bubble rating of two (𝛽 = 0.0830) is much lower than the coefficient of 
the lagged variable that measures the effects of a review with a bubble rating of one (𝛽 = 
0.1267). Therefore, demonstrating that the motivation to publish fake reviews is 
substantially larger after a review with a bubble rating of one than in the case of a review 
with a bubble rating of two.  
Providing some additional supporting evidence to the existence of a relationship between 
review rating and incentives to engage in review manipulation, it is possible to look into 
the effects of the lagged variables of the five and four bubble rating reviews in model 5. 
Both of these measures have a negative coefficient, meaning that a positive rating, in the 
previous month, disincentives the submission of fake reviews with a five bubble rating 
assessment in the next month. This reasoning is in line with what was expected as agents 
with the intent of manipulation will have less motivations to positively influence the 
average bubble rating of a hotel after a positive review. 
Interestingly the variable Log⁡(𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡)𝑡, shows a positive relationship with the positive 
difference of shares. This denotes that as the number of reviews grows, a disproportionate 
share of one-time contributor user reviews possesses a bubble rating assessment of five. 
This finding is difficult to interpret, however, it is assumed that the majority of review 
manipulation is self-inflicted by hotels in order to increase their own average bubble 
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rating or to counterbalance negative reviews. Therefore, as the number of reviews 





















The main conclusions of this thesis support that review manipulation is sufficiently 
economically important. Therefore, it is regarded that the hypothesized manipulation 
equilibrium is not far from reality since agents with different economic incentives will 
indulge in review fraud in a dissimilar extent. This greatly expands current literature on 
review manipulation that has been too focused on the inputs that aim to detect fake 
reviews, neglecting the understanding of what drives review manipulation activity. 
Henceforth, this thesis broadens this field of research towards a newer and alternative 
method that can be easily replicated due to the sheer amount of data displayed in current 
online review platforms. This data can also be employed on the construction of a panel 
data set which can be useful to further investigate the drivers of review manipulation 
activity through the spectrum of time. 
6.2. Practical 
Previous research has found that consumer welfare is greatly impacted by review fraud 
as this deceiving behavior makes consumers take suboptimal purchase decisions. 
Furthermore, it incites mistrust of this communication channel in later purchases 
(Dellarocas, 2006; Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006). Therefore, online review platforms 
have the obligation of minimizing review manipulation by removing reviews deemed 
suspicious from the aggregated average rating, in order to avert its possible consequences. 
Currently, most of the major online review platforms use built-in detection algorithms 
who perform this task automatically. By including the findings of this thesis, as additional 
inputs to complement these algorithms, there are three main outcomes that may provide 
some benefits to improve their detection ability. First, fraud detection would be quicker 
to respond in situations that are commonly associated with an increase in review 
manipulation activity (e.g. after a surge of negative ratings). Additionally, the conclusions 
of this thesis can add to algorithm validation. For example, if the algorithm is not 
identifying fake reviews in situations where businesses are more likely to leave a fake 
review then this should raise concerns about its quality. Lastly, adding these inputs into 
the algorithms would likely make it costlier for actors with the intent of engaging in 
review manipulation to remain undetected. For instance, it is relatively inexpensive and 
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easy to circumvent algorithms that detect review manipulation based on the review 
characteristics (e.g. textual cues). However, the organizational structures of a hotel, for 




















7. Limitations and further research 
A distinct limitation of this study is the chosen unit of analysis: reviews made by users 
with one contribution in their profile history. This unit of analysis serves as an alternative 
measure of review manipulation which, as previously mentioned, is difficult to gauge. 
However, it is likely that most of these reviewers have legitimate intentions and are not 
attempting to cheat the system. Moreover, there are alternative ways to engage in review 
fraud, such as, by buying fake reviews or providing incentives for users to post positive 
reviews. Both of these methods may involve users who already have a substantial number 
of submitted reviews and hence not within the scope of the proposed measure of review 
manipulation. Therefore, it would be interesting, in future research, the development of 
alternative unit of analyses that capture these different methods and that may stance 
themselves as a more suitable measure of review fraud. 
A further limitation encompasses the focus offered to the bubble rating assessment of 
reviews in detriment to its textual characteristics. As users need to provide, besides the 
bubble rating evaluation, a complementary written review, it is possible to make a 
particularly strong claims in the text of a fake review that may increase its impact. Future 
research may also combine both of these characteristics of reviews and study its effects 
on the incentives to engage in review manipulation. 
Another limitation is the lack of understanding that it provides about the impact of review 
manipulation on consumer purchase decisions. Future work can complement this research 
by combining consumers’ purchase decisions with the different economic incentives to 
engage in review manipulation. Such decision may involve whether the consumer 
discounts the possibility of an increase in review manipulation activity or simply makes 
more suboptimal choices when facing an increase of this behavior. 
Additionally, future research can broaden the perspective by adding more elements or 
characteristics that may alter the review manipulation equilibrium besides the ones 
mentioned in this thesis. This can also include further research in other products or 
services or even different online review platforms that provide a suitable setting to 




In essence, this thesis addresses the question of which economic factors drive review 
manipulation. Hence, it is hypothesized that every hotel has a perfect equilibrium between 
the costs and benefits of review fraud that translates into the amount of review 
manipulation activity. Overall, the findings of both the cross-sectional and panel study 
reveal three major factors that may alter this equilibrium. First, the type of organizational 
structure diminishes the benefits and increase the costs of review manipulation. Second, 
as the number of reviews of a hotel increases the benefits from review fraud diminish. 
Third, the bubble rating of a submitted review has an impact on review manipulation 
activity and acts as a good predictor of this phenomenon. This is especially true for 
reviews with an extreme negative rating and those with a positive rating. Moreover, 
although spatial competition was not found to be a significant driver of review 
manipulation, based on the employed measures, it may be an essential factor when used 
in a broader approach. 
Clearly this thesis advances the field of research on review manipulation. Although not 
able to detect directly the characteristics that define a fake review, it provides an 
alternative and unique approach that identifies the scenarios where review manipulation 
activity increases. This might have practical implication that facilitate and improve 
review fraud detection with the aim of preventing consumer deception. Furthermore, it 
can be easily replicated due to its usage of review “helpfulness” characteristics, widely 
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